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THE FUTURE OF PATENT TROLL LEGISLATION 
AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE ENERGY INDUSTRY 
JOHN DAVID WEIDMAN* 
 
Introduction 
Trolls have a proper place in fairy tales as tricksters and monsters. They 
live under bridges (that they did not even build) and only let travelers pass 
if they answer riddles or surrender a tax of gold coins or other valuables. 
The hero in these stories is generally smart enough to answer the troll’s 
riddles. But if they are truly courageous, they kill the troll. Killing a troll is 
much harder than just paying them, so why even put forth the effort? Thus, 
the trolls have a good gig going—minimal cost or risk on their part makes 
for the perfect extortion scheme. 
Modern language uses the term “troll” to describe many different people 
and acts of particular annoyance. Most notably, there are internet trolls: 
people with fake profiles who make inflammatory comments on internet 
news sites and message boards, invoking strong and entertaining reactions 
from legitimate users. Internet trolls are without a doubt the most common 
type of troll a person will encounter, but at the end of the day, they do not 
cause significant economic damage. Therefore, they are not viewed as a 
genuine threat. A more effective and dangerous modern troll—the patent 
troll1—imitates the more traditional meaning of troll: extorting money out 
                                                                                                                 
 * Special thanks for the direction and encouragement from my faculty advisor, Sarah 
Burstein, and my editors: Megan Anson, Douglas Brooking, and Mason Smith. 
 1. Here, “patent troll” refers to entities engaging in extortion or fraud through threat of 
ungrounded patent litigation. The author recognizes that many refer to these entities as NPEs 
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of businesses for infringement of patents (their bridge) that their claims 
unlikely cover. Instead of charging for passage on a bridge, patent trolls 
extort money out of anyone who ventures near the river. The term “patent 
troll” is quite inflammatory—painting a picture of a nasty, monstrous 
extortionist that many think hyperbolizes the extent of the damage they 
actually cause. But with their specific targeting of some major industries—
technology and energy—the economic impact, and the outcry for 
lawmakers to act, it is clear they truly have become monsters.  
The actions of state legislatures,2 former President of the United States 
Barack Obama,3 and technology and energy leaders have urged for the 
creation of federal legislation to prevent the abuse of the patent system at 
the hands of patent trolls. Some technology companies have even begun 
forming giant patent alliances in hopes of avoiding trolls.4 The complicated 
relationship between state and federal legislation in respect to bad faith 
patent claims—the only real indicator of dealing with a patent troll—and 
the appropriate steps required to address this problem have major effects on 
the energy industry. A federal anti-patent-troll law could fix many of the 
problems arising out of the multiple standards from state law, but changes 
in civil procedure and venue law—such as the recently decided Supreme 
Court case TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Group LLC—look 
promising to be more effective at stopping patent trolls overall but less 
effective in the energy industry. 
Problems plague every step in the legislative process—from the very 
definition of a troll to finding ways to protect against them without 
completely gutting patent owner’s rights. Effectively defining “patent troll” 
poses the first of many obstacles for lawmakers. As with any statutory 
definition, too narrow or broad a definition may lead to significant dangers 
for all involved in the patent system. Patent trolls are often referred to as 
                                                                                                                 
or PAEs (discussed later) but has chosen not to include those because of several discussed 
flaws. 
 2. Qian Huang, Grace King & Tim Rawson, Navigating the Landscape of Anti-
Trolling Legislation, INTELL. PROP. MAG. 54, June 2016, available at https://www.pillsbury 
law.com/en/news-and-insights/navigating-the-landscape-of-anti-trolling-legislation.html. 
 3. Anne Flaherty, Congress May Target Patent Trolls Who Prey on Tech Industry 
Innovation, PBS NEWSHOUR, (Apr. 14, 2016, 2:30 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/ 
rundown/congress-may-target-patent-trolls-prey-tech-industry-innovation/ (President Obama 
stated that he supported the bill and patent reform). 
 4. The Patent Troll Problem, LOTNETWORK (2016), http://lotnet.com/the-patent-troll-
problem/. 
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NPEs, or non-practicing entities,5 but that reference misses several 
important distinctions of perfectly legal NPEs, including licensing firms 
and many universities. The definition of patent troll, the state legislation 
and their problems, the lack of federal action, and the possible changes in 
venue law through the Supreme Court all factor into the problems of the 
modern troll and an economic drain on the energy industry. First, the 
comment will address the definition of patent troll and who they are prone 
to target. Then, it will examine what states have attempted to curb trolls and 
the many problems the state laws encounter. Next, the comment will 
consider the options of federal action taken against trolls and the effects of 
recent venue reform through the Supreme Court. Last, possible patent troll 
weaknesses will be studied through the alternative actions such as private 
license agreements designed to quash trolls’ ability to sue certain entities 
for infringement. 
I. Definition Of A Patent Troll And Its Targets 
True patent trolls extort by acting as companies protecting their 
rightfully-owned patents when they either do not own the rights to that 
claimed property or are asserting those rights against someone they have no 
reason to believe infringes. Trolls execute the disguise so well that it is 
increasingly difficult to identify the trolls from legitimate businesses—
many trolls view themselves as legitimate businessmen anyway. Trolls try 
to monetize whatever patents they have accumulated by claiming (or 
threatening to claim) invalid or very weak patent infringements in court 
against businesses who are likely to settle or pay a small license fee to 
avoid paying the hefty price of patent litigation.6 In addition to the 
economic and temporal costs of fighting patent trolls, there is the risk that a 
vague demand letter could turn out to be a legitimate claim, and that by 
paying the relatively small fee, the troll promises to disappear under its 
bridge, taking that risk with it.7  
Technically, patent trolls are a type of NPE.8 Patent licensing firms, 
along with universities and research laboratories, are also NPEs, but they 
foster innovation by protecting against actual infringement, pushing 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Matteo Sabattini, NPEs vs. Patent Trolls: How to Build a Healthy Innovation 
Ecosystem, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/02/04/npe-
patent-trolls-innovation-ecosystem/id=54427/. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.  
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licensing to prevent free riding, and providing revenue through legal means 
that can be poured into new investments.9 Many companies fighting against 
patent trolls choose to call them PAEs, or patent assertion entities, but that 
name implies that asserting patent rights constitutes a de facto wrong or 
illegal action.10 The common use of PAE suggests that a party trying to 
assert a patent—except of course the person accusing the PAE of being a 
troll—has ill intent. The vast difference in these definitions is one that must 
be addressed in an effective piece of legislation. The statutory definition 
must clearly distinguish between the helpful licensing and research of 
legitimate NPEs, the just actions of asserting patent rights against an 
infringer, and harmful entities with an end goal of extortion who merit the 
label of troll. 
As for the common target of patent trolls, the industry must be one with 
a high number of patents and new filings, many large companies likely to 
pay settlement demands rather than go to court, and a wide base of smaller 
companies to better disguise the troll as a small inventor protecting its 
work. In general, the ideal target either has so much money that they would 
rather pay the troll out of annoyance or is small enough that it cannot 
handle the financial burden or risk of one of its few patents failing in court. 
Initially, the main target was the booming technology industry. As that 
industry slowly learned to deal with trolls, they have expanded somewhat to 
the similarly patent-heavy energy industry. 
A. Trolls Started With And Continue Targeting Technology Companies 
The technology industry in the United States has seen many successes in 
recent years, and with that success came an onslaught of patent litigation 
and patent troll claims.11 Though an older—and now failing12—giant, 
Yahoo legal counsel claimed they spent around $100 million fighting patent 
trolls between 2007 and 2015.13 The reaction of the major technology firms 
demonstrates the enormity of the threat posed by patent trolls. Technology 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Id. 
 10. The Patent Troll Problem, supra note 4 (Patent group constantly refers to trolls as 
“PAEs”).  
 11. Gina Hall, Tech Companies Draw Large Amount of Attention from Patent Trolls, 
SILICON VALLEY BUS. J.: BIZJOURNALS.COM (July 13, 2015 7:30 AM), http://www. 
bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2015/07/13/tech-companies-draw-large-amount-of-attention-
from.html. 
 12. See Todd Spangler, Yahoo’s False Prophet: How Marissa Mayer Failed to Turn the 
Company Around, VARIETY (May 24, 2016 9:06 AM), http://variety.com/2016/digital/ 
features/marissa-mayer-yahoo-ceo-1201781310/. 
 13. Flaherty, supra note 3.  
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss1/3
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companies have grown ever more protective and have launched quasi-
alliances against patent trolls.14 Several state legislatures have attempted to 
protect companies from this specific threat even though patents are a 
federal issue.15 Vermont was the first state to enact legislation targeted at 
preventing extortion in the form of patent assertion,16 and it is no 
coincidence that the technology industry in Vermont provides “40% of the 
payroll in the state.”17 For industries with such an important role in the 
state’s economy, legislators will try to pass anything to protect those 
businesses and keep them in state. Whatever the companies viewed as a 
threat themselves, the state legislators viewed as a threat to the state 
economy. And though the technology industry includes behemoth-sized 
companies, bleeding that amount of cash to low-level extortionists cannot 
be an action for any company—regardless of size—that wishes to survive.  
B. Expansion From Silicon Valley To The Energy Business 
With such an easy setup, lucrative rewards, and low risk of liability or 
legal consequences, patent trolls easily target technology18 companies and 
have now expanded into new areas, including the energy industry. In 2013, 
patent trolls shifted—or at least broadened—their focus from targeting 
technology companies to the energy industry.19 The technology industry is 
rumored to be oversaturated with trolls, and technology companies continue 
to become more aggressive in their litigation tactics toward these 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See How LOT Works, LOTNETWORK (2016), http://lotnet.com/how-lot-works/ 
(Companies that have formed alliances specifically to stop patent trolls). 
 15. Huang, King & Rawson, supra note 2.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Abby Isaacs, New Report Shows Tech Industry Makes Up a Quarter of Vermont’s 
Economy, NBC5 (Apr. 14, 2016, 10:32 AM), http://www.mynbc5.com/article/new-report-
shows-tech-industry-makes-up-a-quarter-of-vermont-s-economy/3326875 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 18. The use of “Silicon Valley” and “technology” (used interchangeably) here is 
referring to computer and internet service based technology separate from such tools used in 
the energy industry to place companies such as Google and Schlumberger in their 
corresponding fields while ignoring the numerous overlaps. The author recognizes that the 
term “technology” may be viewed broadly enough to encompass any patentable subject 
matter. Also, Silicon Valley is a generalization and in this context does not include several 
large technology companies such as IBM. 
 19. Jayme Partridge & Todd Patterson, Patent Trolls Find New Target in Energy 
Sector: Study Found 200 Percent Increase in Nonpracticing-Entity Lawsuits during the First 
Half of 2015, ENERGY: A SPECIAL REPORT, THE NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 28, 2015). 
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extortionists.20 These factors may have pushed extorting NPEs to look for 
fresh meat, and energy companies are good prospects for settling early to 
avoid expensive litigation.21 Studies estimate that patent lawsuits filed by 
NPEs against energy companies tripled between 2006 and 2015,22 and the 
first six months of 2015 had twice as many NPE patent lawsuits as the first 
six months of 2014.23 This data demonstrates that these energy-targeted 
troll suits have increased exponentially, with no signs of slowing down.  
This shift may also have roots in patent case law dealing with the scope 
of numerous technology patents. In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 
Alice owned a series of patents that included claims to a common financial 
process that safeguards against one party in a settlement or agreement not 
performing their half by holding the payments until both sides have 
submitted them.24 The Court criticized Alice as trying to get a patent on a 
simple process they knew would be computerized in the future without 
actually trying to produce such a program or new idea themselves; it was 
basic logic that it would be computerized and that there was money to be 
made if the process could be owned. The decision to deny this broad type of 
patent, that brings no transformation to an abstract idea, has barred all 
process patent claims that simply take a business practice and attempt to 
add to it by making computers do the grunt work.25 Had the patent been for 
a machine specifically made for this program that actually did the process 
described, there may have been a different outcome. The Court based its 
decision that the process and code in the claims were not patentable on the 
fact that such a basic concept falls under the patent-ineligible abstract ideas 
of Section 101.26 Since many patent trolls base their arguments on a broad 
interpretation of their software patents, Alice resulted in a setback for trolls 
in the technology industry—but not as large as one might hope.27 Though a 
mix of good and bad news for the technology industry, Alice may be no 
                                                                                                                 
 20. John Barr & Tim Grieger, Patent Trolls Target Oil and Gas Industry, ENERGY 
EXECUTIVE MAG. (2015), http://energy-executive.com/blog/143-patent-trolls-target-oil-and-
gas-industry [http://web.archive.org/web/20161222153343/http://energy-executive.com/ 
blog/143-patent-trolls-target-oil-and-gas-industry]. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Partridge & Patterson, supra note 19. 
 24. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2352-53 (2014). 
 25. Id. at 2359-60. 
 26. Id. at 2360. 
 27. Amanda Ciccatelli, Software Patents Get Struck Down After Alice, INSIDE COUNSEL 
(Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2017/02/01/software-patents-get-struck-
down-after-alice. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss1/3
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news for the energy sector, which has fewer computerized processes that 
were targeted. This case may have contributed to the shift of patent trolls 
toward the energy industry, but it also outlines one of the main tactics in 
legislation against patent trolls, which seeks to limit the scope of claim 
interpretation in an infringement suit. 
There are many possible reasons for targeting the energy industry, but 
the fast-paced and high-risk nature of the business itself creates the type of 
pragmatic settling that patent trolls desire. The broad range of technology, 
equipment, and processes needed to compete successfully in the oil 
industry, and the level of specialized knowledge, leads to more patents in 
general and thus to more patent lawsuits.28 The energy sector’s high costs 
(including legal costs) and overall market size also attract patent trolls.29 In 
such a large industry, with companies of every size nationwide, it is 
difficult to discern between patent trolls and a small business rightfully 
protecting its invention from infringement. To spur on this confusion, 
patent trolls usually form a separate shell corporation to hold just one group 
of patents involved in one lawsuit.30 Then demand letters come from 
unfamiliar corporate entities that add to the illusion of risk of future 
litigation costs and infringement damages for the recipient energy company. 
Creating this shell company prevents the patent troll from losing anything 
more than the lawsuit and limits the possibility that its future claims or 
business for the specific patents will be affected since the troll has no actual 
products, services, or material assets.31 The ability to hide behind a 
corporate veil presents a particularly troublesome problem. Patent trolls are 
not only increasing the number of cases brought overall, but each troll 
brings more cases to court—up to an average of seven cases per NPE in 
2015—because they are enabled by hiding behind shell companies.32  
In addition to the highly-competitive nature of the business, energy 
companies must protect their interests and technology to survive the 
current, large, and prolonged decline in oil prices. For the past two years, 
the price of crude has averaged roughly $50 per barrel.33 The last time they 
sunk that low at the end of 2008, prices quickly returned to around $75 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Barr & Grieger, supra note 20. 
 29. Partridge & Patterson, supra note 19. 
 30. Id. at ¶ 6.  
 31. Id.  
 32. David J. Levy & Nicholaus E. Floyd, Update: Patent Trolls Are Targeting the 
Energy Industry, MORGAN LEWIS (June 29, 2015), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/ 
update-patent-trolls-are-targeting-the-energy-industry. 
 33. WTI Crude, CNBC.COM (May 18, 2017), http://data.cnbc.com/quotes/@CL.1. 
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within a couple of months.34 The prolonged slump in the energy industry 
has resulted in an overall increase in patent litigation, especially in oilfield 
service and equipment companies.35 There is a direct correlation between 
the drop in oil and the increase in competitor-on-competitor patent 
litigation, the likes of which the industry has not seen since the late 1980s.36 
As it became important to cut costs while still protecting the current assets 
of the company to maintain survival, energy companies faced adverse 
incentives both to avoid risk by settling with patent trolls and litigate threats 
to their assets. When the industry becomes less profitable, patents become a 
source of opportunity, with possibilities of profits from both future products 
and from litigation. Patents provide proof that the company can do 
something no one else can, which can be a wonderful tool for increasing 
market share.37 Competitors turn on each other and fight tooth and nail for 
an opportunity to bring in profits from their patent portfolios through 
litigation, in which a win not only helps the company’s bottom line but 
directly weakens the competition.38 The general increase in litigation is not 
solely due to patent trolls, but their increasing persistence in a time of 
economic downturn in the industry has added to the stress of the situation 
caused by other factors. This frustrating dichotomy between avoiding risk 
and having a deep need to protect valuable assets has prompted an outcry 
for legislation to decrease patent troll extortion and the waste that comes 
from their practices. 
II. State Responses To Patent Trolls And Their Problems 
Like most litigation, patent cases are costly; on average, a patent case 
costs more than one million dollars to defend.39 In addition to the price tag, 
patent litigation consists of a long and arduous process despite jurisdictional 
efforts to streamline the process. While there is some dispute over how 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. 
 35. Nushin Huq, Patent Infringement Cases Increase in Oil and Gas Business, 
BLOOMBERG LAW: BIG LAW BUSINESS (Mar. 8, 2016), https://bol.bna.com/patent-
infringement-cases-increase-in-oil-and-gas-business/. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Partridge & Patterson, supra note 19. 
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much monetary damage comes directly from patent trolls, research suggests 
that the damage is significant, reaching multi-billions of dollars.40 
The first states to enact legislation against patent trolls, like Vermont, did 
so with the goal of cutting litigation costs and extortion in their technology 
industry.41 The increase in targeting the energy industry led to states with 
more of a reliance on energy—like Oklahoma and Texas—to pass 
legislation in an attempt to stabilize the state economy.  
In Texas, seventeen of the twenty-five biggest companies by revenue 
headquartered in the state are oil and gas companies.42 Without counting 
any of the numerous out-of-state companies that contribute to the energy 
industry in Texas, these seventeen companies had a combined revenue of 
more than $800 billion in 2013.43 So, when oil went from nearly $100 per 
barrel in June 2014 to less than $50 for two whole years, the implications 
for the state’s economy—which now makes up 9% of United States’ 
economic output—were far-reaching.44 More than half of the 172 oil and 
gas producers and service providers that filed for bankruptcy from 2015 to 
October 2016 have done so in Texas courts.45 Between the end of 2014 and 
Fall 2016, Texas lost more than 91,000 jobs related to the energy industry.46 
It is clear that Texas needs to do whatever necessary to assist its energy 
companies and bolster its economy, and the state legislature is positioned to 
most quickly deal with this kind of significant economic and tax loss. The 
loss of business, jobs, and taxable revenue very likely caused Texas’ anti-
trolling legislation at the end of 2015.47 
                                                                                                                 
 40. James Bessen, The Evidence Is In; Patent Trolls Do Hurt Innovation, THE HARVARD 
BUS. R., Nov. 2014, https://hbr.org/2014/07/the-evidence-is-in-patent-trolls-do-hurt-
innovation (Discusses research showing patent trolls cost $29 billion in legal costs in 2011). 
 41. Isaacs, supra note 17. 
 42. Office of the Governor of Texas: Economic Development and Tourism, Texas Top 
Tier: The Largest Companies Headquartered in Texas, TEXAS.GOV (2014), 
http://gov.texas.gov/files/ecodev/Texas_Largest_Companies.pdf. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Erin Ailworth & Ben Leubsdorf, Texas, Once A Star, Becomes a Drain on the U.S. 
Economy, THE WALL STREET J. (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/texas-once-a-
star-becomes-a-drag-on-the-u-s-economy-1476264601. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Huang, King & Rawson, supra note 2. 
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Oklahoma passed its anti-patent trolling legislation in May 2014, before 
the latest drop in oil prices.48 Oklahoma may no longer completely rely on 
oil as it used to, but oil is still the most significant factor in the state’s 
economy.49 Though patents are a federal issue and Oklahoma tends to shy 
away from regulation, these laws can be used as a specific example of how 
the state treats its own businesses. Just like the legislature of its southern 
neighbor, keeping energy companies in Oklahoma, attracting more business 
to the state, and increasing taxable revenue and jobs were all likely factors 
in passing this piece of business-friendly legislation.  
Overall, there are twenty-nine states that have anti-patent trolling 
legislation and three more that have proposed versions to the state 
legislature.50 However, patents are exclusively subject to federal 
jurisdiction, so state governments cannot address the complicated problem 
of patent trolling with any real definiteness, and the differences in laws may 
lead to many problems. 
A. Problems With State Legislation 
The state legislation varies depending on the goals of those states that 
have applied them, which may be one of the major motivators for the 
federal government to take action. Each state takes a slightly different 
approach, and each has its own problems including discouragement of pre-
lawsuit discussion, limited state power within patent law, possible increase 
in litigation, and large variations among the states on a federal issue. None 
of the laws seem to be affecting the number of patent troll lawsuits.  
1. Decrease In Pre-Lawsuit Discussion May Cause A Rise In Litigation 
States may try to change the law around the procedure and processes for 
certain areas of patent lawsuits, but patents and most of their related 
litigation occur at the federal level. States have taken different approaches, 
but the majority of the laws affect how lawyers in that state conduct patent 
infringement issues outside of court. With the lack of ability to change the 
nature of the lawsuits, legislators turn to what they can control, usually in 
the form of demand letter (and other pre-lawsuit communications) 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Phillip C. Swain, Patent Troll Watch: States Are Pushing Patent Trolls Away from 
the Legal Line, FOLEYHOAG (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.foleyhoag.com/publications/ 
ebooks-and-white-papers/2016/march/state-ag-patent-troll-watch-march-2016. 
 49. Monty Evans, Oklahoma Economic Indicators, OKLAHOMA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
COMMISSION (Apr. 2017), https://www.ok.gov/oesc_web/documents/lmiEconIndPub.pdf. 
 50. Huang, King & Rawson, supra note 2 (showing mining and utilities together as a 
majority of the state GDP). 
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content.51 Miscommunication between parties, or no communication at all, 
can breed a ripe environment for unnecessary lawsuits. One of the main 
problems of these laws is the hindrance of well-intended pre-lawsuit 
communication coupled with no signs of preventing actual patent troll 
extortions.52 
One of the pre-lawsuit paths of destroying patent trolls outlaws “bad 
faith assertions of patent infringement” in an attempt to stop patent trolls 
from sending out near-identical copies of vague demand letters asking for a 
settlement on a patent they have not yet divulged.53 This bad-faith element 
intends to separate patent trolls from legitimate patent infringement suits, 
but the potential for its high misuse as an overreaching defense by 
infringers must be considered when choosing a venue.54 For protection in 
these jurisdictions, it is common that all correspondence is kept on record in 
case a bad faith assertion complaint arises out of either party.55 The states 
often treat the legislation as a mostly idle threat, allowing only the attorney 
general to instigate civil investigation or actions in court, with formal 
complaints needed to begin such an investigation.56 The difficulty has 
landed not on the trolls as planned but on the lawful patent holders seeking 
to properly assert their rights, forcing them into vague communication with 
possible infringers. While all the state legislation has some form of bad 
faith assertion as part of the law,57 the many variations in definition bring 
confusion and fear into any pre-lawsuit discussion, causing less of this type 
of communication and a possible increase in litigation. 
To avoid violating these types of legislation, a company asserting a good 
faith demand letter may have to include sensitive information to a 
competitor or possible opposing party.58 The information for a now-proper 
demand letter often requires information about which claims of which 
patent are in question for infringement.59 However, giving out such 
information in the very first contact with a possible infringer is a dangerous 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Erich Spangenberg, Unintended Consequences of Patent Troll Legislation, IPNAV 
(2016), http://www.ipnav.com/blog/unintended-consequences-of-patent-troll-legislation/ 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54. Huang, King, & Rawson, supra note 2.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Spangenberg, supra note 53.  
 59. Id.  
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legal move.60 If the other party has specific information about the patent 
claims and the company that owns them, that party can file its own lawsuit 
or declaratory judgment action in its favor.61 Many first letters keep a mood 
of professionalism, yet still have a very amicable tone to avoid such 
unnecessary jumps in litigation.62 Keeping the first letter light provides a 
chance for both parties to sign a confidentiality agreement and a 
forbearance agreement, which benefits all parties involved.63 Specifically 
allowing for these kinds of communications in the legislation may prevent 
unnecessary lawsuits, but none of the current legislation specifically 
provides for this exception.64 The current state legislation is still fairly new, 
and almost none of it has been put to the test in court.65 
This forced shift of letters from seeking general information to giving 
out very important details may cause a complete change in the beginning 
approach to patent infringement suits. Instead of gauging the other party 
through protected communication, the options are now to either give them 
all the information necessary to bring a lawsuit themselves or simply go 
straight to suing the other party without warning or negotiations of a 
licensing deal.66 For how little this will stop patent trolls, it creates more 
grief for people the legislation means to protect. 
2. Large Variation In State Laws 
There are twenty-nine different pieces of legislation with different 
wording and different approaches to preventing patent troll extortion.67 
Though those states are trying to accomplish the same goals, there are 
significant differences in the laws as a whole.68 In general, the states’ laws 
range from broad legislation that gives courts the power to decide what 
factors are more important in each case, to narrow definitions that give 
exact examples of what determines bad faith assertions.69 The major 
differences occur in the definition of bad faith, who can bring an action 
against a patent troll, and what actions actually make an entity a patent troll 
in those states. The following consider the content of three states’ statutory 
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attempts to stop bad faith demand letters shows the range of differences in 
state laws against patent trolls.  
a) Vermont 
Vermont lists nine factors for a judge to consider when determining 
whether a party “has made a bad faith assertion of patent 
infringement. . . .”70 The nine factors are generally put into the following 
categories: action taken or not taken by the asserter, the contents of the 
demand letter, and the nature of the claim.71 The factors concerning the 
information given to the other party include requirements for a demand 
letter to contain the patent number in question, “the name and address of the 
patent owner,” and “factual allegations” relating to the specific 
infringement of the patent claims.72 The other factors concern actions taken 
(or not taken) before or after initial communication to properly abide by the 
first requirements, to perform analysis of the claims, and general 
consideration for deceptive, wasteful, meritless, or repetitious court 
action.73 The law focuses on what should be done before the plaintiff brings 
a patent infringement complaint to ensure that unnecessary settlements are 
not extorted from Vermont individuals and corporations. To achieve that 
goal, a judge wields the power to determine bad faith with loose factors, 
plus any that the court deems relevant.74 This gives the Attorney General 
the power to act on behalf of the target in civil court as well as a private 
cause of action with a multitude of available damages.75 
Many states have followed Vermont’s lead by creating a broad list of 
factors falling into categories of contents of the demand letter, actions taken 
or not taken by the troll, and the nature of the claim.76 Vermont has faced 
complaints from disgruntled lawyers, but similarly, so have most of the 
states that tried to copy or improve upon what was provided in the Vermont 
legislation.77 The immense flexibility suggests that the statutes are more of 
a scare tactic to be used for threats than an enforceable law.  
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The Texas law lists three definite and specific ways that the patent troll 
asserts a bad faith patent claim and is liable for possible damages.78 The 
most blatant is when the party states in a demand letter that they have filed 
a lawsuit concerning the patent infringement when they have not.79 Next, 
Texas established criteria for whether a claim is “objectively baseless,” 
which include claiming a patent or right to license a patent which the sender 
does not possess, trying to use an invalid patent, or using activity that 
happened after the expiration of the patent.80 Finally, the communication 
must have the specifications of who asserts a claim, the patent concerned, 
and “at least one product, service, or technology” that has infringed the 
patent.81 
The Texas law differs the most from the Vermont law in the definition of 
bad faith assertion and the possible actions.82 The two state’s laws occupy 
separate ends on the range of narrow and broad definitions and powers 
given. Though both states presumably passed their respective laws with 
different industries in mind, and Texas had a couple of years to see how 
other states would form their laws, both laws encounter similar problems. 
While Vermont more loosely defines its bad faith definition and allows for 
a private cause of action, Texas has limited the action and provided no 
instruction or mechanism on how to bring the suit to the Attorney General’s 
attention.83 This may suggest the Texas legislature wanted to have a law 
that encourages potential patent troll victims to stay in state while not 
damaging the unique, plaintiff-friendly, and patent-heavy phenom of the 
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (“EDTX”).84 
c) Oklahoma 
Oklahoma’s law falls between Vermont and Texas, with a strong list of 
specific acts that are not allowed and another list of actions and parties that 
are exceptions to the rule. The forbidden actions include any written or 
electronic communication falsely claiming to file a patent suit, a consistent 
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pattern of threatened litigation with no filing, or any communication with 
assertions that lack a reasonable basis in fact or law.85 The law also 
contains many options specifically stated to show what assertions may be 
seen as unreasonable.86 The exceptions to the rule include letters advising 
others on the right to license or enforce the patent, communicating the 
availability of sale, notices of infringement, or any letter that seeks a license 
or compensation for infringement of a patent that is not in bad faith. Also, 
the statute does not apply to universities, a licensing firm on behalf of 
universities, or any patent owner involved in substantial research or 
manufacturing.  
While Oklahoma has many examples and factors for what constitutes a 
bad faith demand letter, the broad exceptions seem to make the law hard to 
enforce. Any party that makes a product or works for a university, is not in 
danger of breaking these restrictions. Those exceptions directly address 
several problems that can arise from multiple definitions of patent troll. The 
law consists of hardline rules with many exceptions, but it may have been 
better if the legislature set up both as factors rather than strict rules. The 
current setup may make it possible for patent trolls to fall under one of the 
exceptions and gives no definition of bad faith, but it defines what makes an 
illegal demand letter in a clearer way than Texas or Vermont. 
While Vermont was the first, and Texas has special circumstances 
surrounding its law, most of the states with anti-patent-troll laws remain in 
the middle of the two laws, like Oklahoma and Virginia. Virginia provides 
many factors to consider in the bad faith definition while also providing 
several factors that count toward good faith actions.87 The law, like most, 
provides investigation and penalties through the Attorney General but does 
not form a private cause of action. However, it clearly and easily allows for 
a complaint to be made with the Attorney General and even has a patent 
troll unit for that specific use.88 Most states have attempted to make a 
business-favorable law without interfering with the federal system (like 
Vermont) or being too narrow (like Texas). Unfortunately, none of the 
current laws has made any noticeable difference in the number or cases 
with patent trolls or for patent infringement cases in general, both of which 
have continued to increase.89 
                                                                                                                 
 85. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 112A (West 2017). 
 86. Id. at § 112A(3). 
 87. VA. CODE ANN. § 591-2152.86 (West 2017). 
 88. Huang, King & Rawson, supra note 2. 
 89. See Barr & Grieger, supra note 20; see also, Partridge & Patterson, supra note 19. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
54 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
3. Patent Troll Cases Continue To Grow And Evolve 
As the patent landscape evolves, with a general increase in the filing and 
active protection of patents, the techniques used by patent trolls evolves 
along with it. Many of the earlier patent trolls have now moved from 
asserting patents to focus on less risky legal operations. A lawyer that 
worked with TechSearch, a firm considered one of the first patent trolls 
(and may be the root of the term after they barred defendants in their case 
from calling them “patent extortionists”), announced that he was ready to 
leave the business due to its higher cost and risk.90 Though older patent 
trolls may think the area too saturated with smaller groups trying to 
capitalize on their patents, this switch keeps the threat of patent trolls alive 
and well.91 TechSearch held several very broad patents that it asserted 
against as many people as it could.92 The famous reputation of the troll 
previously helped it win more settlements, but now those types of 
companies are singled out and intentionally taken to court.  
The heightened risk of getting taken to court, coupled with what some 
lawyers say are greatly increased costs in IPRs, has created an environment 
for taking down these big, broad patent trolls, but has also allowed for 
smaller entities to bring an onslaught of smaller suits against as many 
people as possible.93 The “shotgun approach” defines this tactic because 
there are multiple chances to hit a target—as long as one hits, the other 
misses do not usually cause any harm.94 The shotgun approach comes with 
a smaller success rate and smaller returns per threat or suit, but there are 
many entities able to thrive on this platform. The repetitious mass 
communication starts to more closely resemble email spam or mass 
telemarketing, and this increase likely led state legislators to change the 
demand letters necessary to carry out this plan. If the new shotgun demand 
letter approach stops working, patent trolls will likely evolve to a new 
method just as they have in the past.  
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4. Accusing Company Of Being A Troll May Cause Unfair Damage 
On the other side of anti-patent-troll legislation is the damage that can be 
caused to a legitimate assertion of patent rights provided and protected by 
the Federal Constitution. The mere use of the term “patent troll” in the 
media and scholarship on the subject could make it more difficult to 
rightfully protect against true patent infringement.95 For a small inventor to 
be able to use the patent system correctly, he often needs to enlist the help 
of a patent enforcement specialist.96 And the easiest way to pay for these 
specialists is to license out, partner with, or even sell the patent through a 
non-practicing entity that has the resources to make the patent profitable.97 
Most legislation protects large companies—more likely to get an onslaught 
of infringement claims and settle to vague demands—from patent trolls but 
ignores the inverse situation of the small inventor trying to enforce his own 
claim or defend a frivolous claim brought by a large business (not a troll in 
this case but rather an “ogre”).98 Legislators may not be ignoring this on 
purpose, but large businesses that have more of an effect on taxes and 
employment numbers, and the state’s economy, are very likely the target 
for protection of these laws. 
Large technology and energy companies are often viewed as patent trolls 
themselves. For instance, IBM, which filed 7,534 patents in 2014 and 7,355 
in 2015, reports more than $1 billion in annual revenue directly from 
licensing, and an inquiry into their research and development department 
suggests it likely profits around $25 billion a year from its inventions.99 
Considering the sheer volume of patents IBM owns, there is no doubt that 
they have spent a lot of time and money protecting those patents. Patent 
extortion legislation may enable some larger companies to destroy 
competition and profit from others’ inventions that do not actually infringe, 
which is very similar to what it is designed to stop.  
Many schools and courtrooms have begun to notice the negative effects 
of using the term “patent troll” to identify a non-practicing entity, or in 
some cases anyone who has asserted their right to protect their lawfully 
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owned patent.100 Several courts have prevented litigants from using the 
term “troll” in the courtroom and in certain motions, believing the way 
media and academia have portrayed patent trolls causes prejudice against 
the accused party whether they are an extorting NPE or not.101 In the 
popular radio show and podcast, This American Life, the episode “When 
Patents Attack” delves into the oddities of the patent troll practices and the 
Eastern District of Texas.102 Though the show focuses on a large and well-
known patent troll, Intellectual Ventures, and its older techniques of patent 
assertion, the entirety of the show calls out patent trolls in general, 
including the more evolved modern versions.103 They also focus on the role 
of EDTX and its unusually high number of patent suits.104 The district hears 
the majority of the country’s patent cases, and it has proven an entertaining 
road stop for reporters and journalists to visit the empty offices of the patent 
trolls in Marshall, Texas that clearly only exist to get favorable 
jurisdiction.105  
Similar to the radio show on patents, a popular segment on Last Week 
Tonight with John Oliver discussed many great points and problems 
surrounding patent trolls but vilified some very common and accepted legal 
practices.106 For example, the host mentions how patent trolls do not make 
anything and are thus not useful, which shows a misunderstanding of the 
importance of lawful NPEs.107 He also blamed trial lawyers for the failing 
of a federal anti-patent-troll bill in the Senate, but there have been so many 
attempts and versions of these bills, with their own groups of problems, 
springing from many different areas, that it is hard to blame one group for 
such a complicated law.108 
Companies are branded as patent trolls quite often, whether they earn the 
labeling or not. Many commonly refer to IPNav as a patent troll, but it is 
difficult to prove whether such a large company is truly a patent troll. 
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However, IPNav has sued more than 1,600 companies in the past 5 years, 
more than any in the patent field.109 With that many lawsuits, it would be 
hard to say that all are baseless or that all are firmly founded. And if the 
company were to face ruin because of its riskier cases, that would not be 
fair to the inventors or holders of its other patents. IPNav is likely not in 
any danger of being mislabeled considering its own website describes it as a 
service to turn “idle patents into cash cows,” but there are similar NPEs that 
suffer from the bad reputation that comes along with being labeled a patent 
troll.110 
The bad reputation that comes with filing bad patent suits against others 
is well deserved, but the widespread misuse of the term may lead to even 
more confusion and fear from someone faced with a possible patent 
infringement suit from a real troll. The damaging effects of this rhetoric are 
some of the main reasons that state and federal legislators must include 
clear definitions of actions constituting a troll in their legislation if it is 
meant to benefit patent holders. 
5. Large Portion Of Cases Are All In Eastern District Of Texas 
A large problem with state legislation stems from the federal jurisdiction 
of patent claims. Moreover, a single district hears the majority of the 
cases—a small town in eastern Texas. One of the more interesting aspects 
of the United States patent law, the Eastern District of Texas appeared on 
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver111, This American Life112, the CBS 
jury-consultant show Bull,113 and more.  
As discussed on the excerpt of Last Week Tonight, patent trolls favor this 
venue for litigation because of its quick trial periods and plaintiff-friendly 
decisions.114 The show used the example of a troll that sued a company who 
helps disabled persons find employment.115 The company had planned to 
sue in the EDTX because suits filed there generally favor plaintiffs, which 
in turn creates an incentive to settle.116 Frequent plaintiffs and defendants 
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have been pouring money into the local economy. For example, Samsung 
built the outdoor skating rink next to the courthouse, hoping that jurors 
would associate Samsung with good things in their community.117  
The Eastern District of Texas has become somewhat of a lightning rod 
for patent litigation, and many have speculated as to why the small area has 
more patent cases than any other venue and whether it is good for those 
cases to end up with only a handful of judges.118 The court hears around 
forty-four percent of all patent lawsuits in the United States.119 However, 
this may be more of a venue problem than a patent legislation problem.  
In 1988, Congress changed the general venue law, which was interpreted 
as removing the special rule that restricted venue choices.120 Essentially, 
plaintiffs could choose the most favorable venue for their lawsuit.121 A 
study by Villanova and Santa Clara law school professors for PatentlyO 
revealed that a slight change in patent venue laws could prevent sixty-two 
percent of EDTX cases from being filed there, thus curtailing the supposed 
plaintiff advantage.122 The new change in venue law through TC Heartland 
could significantly damage patent trolls’ home-field advantage in East 
Texas, but any businesses already based in Texas remain unaffected. 
Not only does the court currently boast an oddly high number of patent 
suits, but NPEs initiate ninety-five percent of patent cases in the EDTX.123 
Though not all NPEs are trolls, trolls are NPEs and this lopsided number 
suggests that patent troll activity does not happen more in any other forum.  
Many have theorized as to how or why this phenomenon started, but the 
numbers clearly show that something is different. While defendants win on 
summary judgment in the average case involving overly abstract patents 
seventy-one percent of the time nationally, in EDTX only twenty-seven 
percent result in summary judgment against the plaintiff.124 These decisions 
have changed in most venues due to Alice which resulted in throwing out 
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many software patents and other broad or abstract claims.125 The fact that 
nearly half of all patent cases are heard in a district following a Supreme 
Court decision differently than all other forums may not have been a reason 
to force a change in the court’s actions. But this was certainly reason 
enough to prevent baseless venue shopping. 
The immense number of cases involving an unusually high amount of 
NPEs seem to be the perfect conditions for patent trolls. The number of 
cases allows them to hide in plain sight while still apparently choosing the 
venue based on the court’s experience, the case history of patent litigation, 
and the area’s openness to intellectual property owners. The town of Tyler, 
Texas even has a website proclaiming how the whole area is “IP 
Friendly.”126 While this district has its own problems of appearing corrupt, 
many legitimate reasons exist for picking such a venue. Having a court 
well-versed in patent law is a rarity, and it saves time and money to deal 
with smaller cases in a venue that has seen more than its fair share of patent 
cases, even if the outcome favors one side consistently. Defendants likely 
will waive personal jurisdiction to still take advantage of the speedy patent 
docket in EDTX. Special circumstances like the Eastern District of Texas 
make it difficult to find an effective state law against patent extortion and 
make it equally complicated for any possible federal legislation. 
III. The Forced Federal Response To Patent Trolls 
With the many problems stemming from state legislation, the pressure 
increases for federal legislation to fix the patent troll problem. Still, no 
consensus exists as to which federal approach would be effective to impede 
patent trolls while avoiding complicating patent litigation. Past and current 
versions of federal law include changes in both patent law and civil 
procedure that attack patent trolls at different angles, and both aim to solve 
the problem single-handedly.  
Pressure for federal legislation comes from many different areas, but all 
appear to be concerned that patent trolls will continue to stifle innovation, 
the main motivation and purpose of the U.S. patent system.127 Calls for 
congressional action from businesses, state governments, and even the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) have been growing 
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louder and continue to be very public. The 2016 Consumer Electronics 
Show in Las Vegas had a director from the USPTO attend as a keynote 
speaker, marking the first time anyone from the Office has spoken at the 
large technology show, and giving credence to the growing concern of 
patent trolls in innovative industries.128 The main focus of the director’s 
speech was that Congress needed to enact legislation to protect these 
industries from the costly price of dealing with patent trolls.129 President 
Obama, large technology and petroleum industry leaders, and many state 
governments have all supported federal legislation for patent infringement 
reform specifically for extortion—though it has led to several attempts in 
the legislature, nothing has been passed into law.130  
It is somewhat unusual for an issue that seems so one-sided in the 
public’s eyes to have garnered so much attention. The public outcry and 
media attention could possibly stem from lobbying efforts from the large 
and powerful industries that continually find themselves targeted, or it 
could just come from patent trolls’ significant, negative economic impact. 
Some journalists suggest trial lawyers have actually lobbied against the 
federal legislation just so they can continue working on baseless lawsuits, 
but this pessimistic view inaccurately represents patent attorneys and 
oversimplifies how patent trolls cause economic damage.131 Either way, this 
problem has gained the attention of all areas of government involved in 
patents and commerce. Yet there still has been no consensus on what a 
plausible solution will look like. The growing problems are likely to be met 
with more outcry but unlikely to be met with any effective federal 
legislation.  
A. TROL Act And TPTP Act 
There have been many efforts at federal legislation, but they have all 
come to a stalemate or flat-out failed. For instance, the Targeting Rogue 
and Opaque Letters (“TROL”) Act sought to minimize the “abusive use” of 
demand letters by any patent-asserting entity, similar to most current state 
legislation.132 The TROL Act enables courts “to impose sanctions or 
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reduced damages on those parties improperly sending demand letters.”133 
The act even called for Federal Trade Commission penalties for the 
distributors who do not follow the sanctions.134 Another failed bill was 
Trade Protection Not Troll Protection (“TPTP”) Act from March 2016, 
which aimed to use the U.S. International Trade Commission to enforce 
regulations and penalties on extorting NPEs.135  
These are just two of many pieces of legislation136 that Congress never 
seriously examined. The state laws could be a sort of experiment to see how 
similar federal legislation might be effective, but the lack of state power 
over patents itself keeps those laws from being effective. If the federal 
government wants to take patent trolls seriously, it must be willing to take 
some action, even if likely to fail.  
B. Federal Legislation Is Still Necessary In Addition To Supreme Court 
Venue Decision 
The TC Heartland venue case may solve venue problems, but it will not 
likely stop trolls.137 This case decided whether the patent venue statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1400(b)—which says that patent lawsuits “may be brought in the 
judicial district where the defendant resides” and was interpreted as residing 
in the state of incorporation—will be the only source for venue choices in 
patent lawsuits.138 The alternative, which had also been used, was 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391(c)—which allowed for corporate entities to reside in multiple 
judicial districts in certain circumstances.  
The Supreme Court had made a similar ruling before in Fourco Glass 
Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp.139 There, the Court decided that the 
stricter § 1400(b) would apply to patent cases, allowing only for venue in 
the state of incorporation, But Fourco Glass was essentially overruled when 
the legislature amended § 1391(c) in 1988.140 Since then, the circuits 
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remained split which caused the Supreme Court to grant certiorari. Though 
purely procedural, this decision could provide an avenue for stopping patent 
trolls through restricting venue (specifically away from the Eastern District 
of Texas).  
Before TC Heartland went to the Supreme Court, federal legislation 
designed to restrict venue shopping in patent cases made its way through 
Congress before being stalled. A study for PatentlyO showed that a slight 
change in patent venue laws would prevent sixty-two percent of Eastern 
District of Texas cases from being filed there, and from having a supposed 
plaintiff advantage.141 However, now that suits brought against corporations 
in EDTX must be against those incorporated or that “ha[ve] committed acts 
of infringement and ha[ve] a regular and established place of business,”142 
in Texas—which will decrease the overall lawsuit filings by patent trolls—
it may also increase the number of demand letters they send.  
The yet-to-be-passed Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination 
(“VENUE”) Act and heightened pleading rules looked promising to change 
the number of frivolous patent claims143 and unfair district shopping based 
on bogus places of business.144 the effectiveness of the result of TC 
Heartland will likely have a direct influence on whether this legislation will 
be passed—or if it would even be needed. Before the decision, Senator 
Orrin Hatch claimed that patent reform has more issues than just venue, 
and, despite the Supreme Court’s decision, he would be pushing for venue 
reform.145 A federal push for patent venue reform adopting law from the 
Supreme Court could be the easy-to-pass piece of legislation needed to 
jumpstart other patent reform, such as an anti-patent-trolling law. 
The restricted venue option from the Supreme Court would prevent a lot 
of patent trolls from suing certain patent holders in the Eastern District, just 
like the proposed legislation. But that only slows down the trolls; it does not 
solve the problem. Patent trolls will still be able to sue a large portion of the 
energy industry in EDTX because of the industry’s size in the state. Any 
company incorporated or with a principal place of business in Texas is not 
helped by this decision, and for the energy industry, that is a high 
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portion.146 There are still many options for favorable venues for patent 
plaintiffs, and no amount of venue restriction will stop trolls. Instead, the 
impact on patent trolls may be decided by how the federal courts of 
Delaware treat patent cases because so many companies are incorporated 
there.147 
As far as the scope of patents is concerned, Alice cut into the number of 
computer patents targeted by patent trolls, but it has yet—and is not 
likely—to make a dent in the energy industry’s patents. Adversely, a 
similar approach of preventing broad patents in court through legislation 
may have more of a negative effect on patents as a whole. While the energy 
industry and other economic forces want to spur innovation and protect 
against extortion, they also want to be able to protect their rightfully owned 
patents. This type of legislation would prevent too many valid claims from 
going to court, and it would only mean more economic woes for the energy 
industry.  
 Though venue reform may protect other industries from patent trolls, the 
reform will likely have a lackluster effect on the energy industry, and still in 
need of further legislative protection. However, following the states’ 
examples of legislation may simply lead to the same more problems the 
states have. Federal legislation must attack the methods of patent trolls 
directly and not only rely on venue reform.  
IV. Other Alternatives 
Any decline in patent troll extortion will likely be due to personal 
changes in approaches to patent claim settlements, not to state law. There 
are likely endless ways for companies or lawyers to take action to prevent 
extortion by patent trolls, but there are also courses of action (though far-
fetched) that may stop trolls from attacking in the first place. Only federal 
legislation would have enough power to cut down on extortion whether 
through fear of action or guiding law in courts where patent cases are 
determined. With the high demand for action and the willingness of state 
governments to experiment with their theories, it is likely that the states will 
continue to try more options; the federal government will have to wait and 
see what works. If the law does not work at the state level, it does not mean 
it will not work at the federal level because of its jurisdiction over patents. 
Therefore, the federal legislation may need to try the states’ methods as 
well as some new techniques. However, the slow pace of federal legislation 
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means that it will likely be years—and millions (or billions) of dollars—lost 
in the meantime to pesky trolls.  
A. Looking To Silicon Valley And Private Agreements 
The technology industry became more extreme while dealing with trolls, 
which created a divide between companies who were constantly being 
attacked by trolls and trying to ward off their numerous demands with 
minimal settlements or licenses and companies who became so-called 
patent assertion entities. These patent assertion entities may want to just 
protect their intellectual property. But due to the now extreme measures 
they are likely to face in the technology industry, they must aggressively 
pursue patent litigation anywhere and everywhere to keep their doors open 
by securing high revenues to buy other patents. It has become a vicious 
cycle that continues to weigh on the technology industry and that the energy 
industry must try to avoid. 
Ira Blumberg, the Vice President of Intellectual Property at Lenovo, 
discussed his time working for a large patent troll and that they operate for 
the good of the inventors.148 In theory, if licensing firms did not buy patents 
from inventors, most would not make any money from the invention. And 
for the patents to be bought, the firms must be able to make money through 
patent litigation.149 On the other (and perhaps more convincing) side, patent 
trolls do much more harm than good to business and innovation, which are 
cornerstones of the patent system.150 The patent troll where Blumberg 
worked, due to their size and experience, was not even concerned with the 
validity of a claim because they knew that it would cost their targets 
between two and three million dollars just to find out if the claim had 
merit.151 This allowed the troll to receive settlements of up to one million 
dollars, which is quite different than the original technology patent trolls. 
The energy industry wants to avoid those high-dollar settlements, so it must 
observe what did and did not work for the technology industry.152 
The technology industry uses all its might and influence to call for 
federal legislation and has successfully received legislation from states 
(after all, they are the reason for the first anti-patent-troll laws). But 
industry leaders have also taken it upon themselves to investigate which 
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private actions outside of the courtroom can be utilized to protect against 
patent trolls. For Blumberg and Lenovo, the necessary private action 
seemed to be joining a nonprofit community of companies called the 
License of Transfer Network (“LOT”)153, which works to minimize threats 
from patent trolls by ensuring that their patents cannot be asserted against 
another member of LOT.154 While this particular group has many large 
technology companies, banks, and automakers—such as Amazon, Lenovo, 
Google, Ford, Nissan, and JPMorgan Chase155—the entire agreement rests 
on their willingness not to sue one another for patent infringement, which is 
going to be a harder sell in the energy industry due to the highly 
competitive (and sometimes hostile) nature between companies. 
Technically, because the agreement is only for licensed patents, 
Company A may still get to sue Company B for breach of contract, which 
may or may not have anything to do with their patents that they share. 
However, if Company A were to license or sell the patent to a licensing 
firm, or perhaps even a subsidiary that is not part of LOT, then Company 
A’s licensing firm cannot get damages in a patent infringement suit against 
Company B. However, Company A would still be able to force Company B 
into a licensing deal. Because few members would directly hold patents in 
the parent company that is a member of LOT, it is essential that alliance 
members not infringe against or sue one another. The incentive to stay 
peaceful is upholding the value of innovation for the future of their 
industries, but there are numerous benefits to these giants for making their 
own intellectual property rules.  
For the smaller companies involved, many entered the LOT group 
through Google’s Patent Starter Program, which gave groups of patents to 
fifty different startups (the only requirement for a “startup” seemed to be a 
company with revenues between $500,000 and $20 million) that applied to 
the program on the condition they would join LOT.156 Considering the 
strong limitations within the group, any startup that already has patents they 
need to sell or license out for capital may no longer be able to do so and 
will definitely get a lower price as part of LOT. Thus, even Google suggests 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Id. 
 154. How LOT Works, supra note 14.  
 155. Our Community, LOTNETWORK (2016), http://lotnet.com/our-community/. 
 156. Kevin A. Rieffel, Why Google Wins by Giving Away Patents to “Startups” Willing 
to Join the LOT Network, IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 2, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/ 
2015/08/02/why-google-wins-by-giving-away-patents-to-startups-willing-to-join-the-lot-
network/id=60162/. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
66 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
no company join without a significant look into future legal and monetary 
ramifications.157 
Many of the same companies also participated in the Industry Patent 
Purchase Program (“IP3”), which provides a special portal for the offer of 
sale of patents to all members at once.158 This portal makes it easier for 
inventors to sell directly to industry giants who will pay a fair value for a 
patent and will hopefully make it less tempting to sell patents to patent 
trolls who will never make use of the invention other than for exploitation. 
This directly attacks patent trolls’ logic that they offer inventors their only 
opportunity to make money. Also, a function like this is much more 
advantageous for competitors to know in which areas their competition may 
be investing resources. However, this alliance may do more harm than 
good. If the LOT alliance applies only when the patent is sold or 
transferred—and the patent cannot be asserted against any member—there 
is no reason to spend money on a patent indefensible against half the giants 
in the industry. If the buyer gets a patent from Google, Lenovo may directly 
infringe upon it and cannot be stopped, rendering the patent worthless. If 
LOT becomes a large group, they may stop some patent trolls out of sheer 
intimidation, but only by gutting the worth of their own patents. It is likely 
that the IP3 system will only attract patent holders who were already 
opposed to selling to patent trolls because the system does not provide a 
good environment for patent holders to get the best price.159 This setup 
trades a federal system of protection for private agreements that seem 
unlikely likely to be upheld. 
B. Why Energy Cannot Copy Silicon Valley 
The energy and technology industries are both prime targets for patent 
trolls, but there are major differences that will lead to a divide when it 
comes to how they both deal with those trolls. LOT has expressed a desire 
to diversify its members to provide a wider base of protection, stating that 
seventy-five percent of litigation from trolls against JPMorgan Chase (one 
of its first larger members outside of the technology industry) were for 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Id. 
 158. Jeff John Roberts, Tech and Auto Firms Join Google-Led Patent Purchase 
Program, FORTUNE MAG. (May 18, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/18/patents-ip3/. 
 159. Ryan Davis, 4 Things to Know About Google, Ford Patent Marketplace, LAW360 
(May 23, 2016, 7:34 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/798802/4-things-to-know-
about-google-ford-patent-marketplace.  
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss1/3
2017]        The Future of Patent Troll Legislation 67 
 
 
patents outside of the banking industry.160 However, it is easy to see how 
patents in the technology industry overlap with those in banking and 
automobile manufacturing, especially with Google’s research into self-
driving cars.161 And though the energy industry increasingly relies on new 
technology from Silicon Valley to help cut costs during this slump,162 
members of the LOT network like Google and Amazon favor heavier 
regulation and a push for full use of “renewable energy,” and generally 
label large energy companies as the enemy.163 On the other side, IBM, 
which has been consistently filing thousands of patent assets a year, has a 
large hand in energy and utility analytics164 and is not part of LOT.165 
Though some large oil companies may be able to build a similar alliance 
with smaller patent holders, the nature of the energy industry suggests it is 
not likely to adopt such a model of private agreement.  
Oil companies could create a group like LOT if they could agree not to 
sue each other, which is unlikely. But if they could persuade IBM and other 
energy-friendly technology companies to agree not to sue, they could 
accrue numerous patents. That scenario is likewise implausible, as it favors 
IBM with a negligible advantage to the energy companies. The technology 
industry appears to view the patent system in a much more idealistic way, 
with a different grasp on innovation and putting it above the competition in 
some sense. The setup is essentially a patent sharing system that lets the 
members steal ideas without being sued. While coding has some other 
protection, like copyright, the energy industry does not have a secondary 
protection for this kind of setup, except in the form of contracts. So, for the 
energy industry to set up a patent infringement alliance or patent licensing 
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alliance similar to the LOT Network, it would require several large 
companies to begin with extensive contracts that protect their most sensitive 
intellectual property, while still allowing for protection against trolls. Then 
the group would need to add medium and small companies, or the group 
would go after all small companies as if they were trolls (or ogres). If the 
larger companies treat all small companies as trolls, then the patent system 
may collapse within the industry. The problem stemming from the mix of 
big and small companies is that the larger companies will still provide more 
patents and therefore more sway in the group. Thus, the structure of these 
groups would also have to be delicately handled.  
A patent lawsuit could make or break a small company. This makes them 
less of a target for trolls, or at least for less money, but it also makes it less 
advantageous for them to team up with an energy giant. They run the risk of 
the larger companies using their patents and getting much less in return for 
their agreement. Yet there is not much incentive for the members of LOT to 
join, and they still have amassed numerous (600,000) patents and are 
protected from being sued for infringing on any of them.166 If there a group 
of large energy patent holders formed an alliance, they would only provide 
protection from the patents that have been sold to trolls by an energy 
company in the alliance. Many patents (perhaps the majority) asserted by 
trolls are not failed assets of an energy company that would be part of this 
alliance, but ones acquired from a small company or individual that was 
forced to sell for capital or a lack of manufacturing ability. So, most of the 
troll’s weaponry would remain untouched without extensive membership 
from smaller energy patent holders. 
If the energy industry took more private action against trolls, it may be 
easier to form an alliance with fewer restrictions on suing each other and 
more on selling patents. However, as the many complications of the energy 
industry show, private action similar to the technology industry will be 
more difficult in the face of industry giants and their competitiveness 
toward each other. The rise in patent suits correlating with the drop in oil 
prices was due to large and medium oil companies attempting to deprive 
one another of capital, not an increase in large companies attacking small 
companies that had no way to pay off the damages. Without a serious 
change in the landscape of the energy industry, an alliance is more trouble 
than getting federal legislation passed in the first place, especially if 
technology and energy lobby together for a version on which they agree. 
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Another area in which technology companies have changed their 
dealings with patent trolls is their zealous protection of their own patents 
and their willingness to see a lawsuit through to court. Technology 
companies have become harsher on patent asserters, which scares away 
some patent trolls. But it also costs a lot to develop that reputation and 
makes every single case have higher stakes. There is no quick fix for the 
whole industry that will prevent extortion, nor will a successful change 
prevent loss forever unless it results in changes at the individual level of the 
lawyers for both plaintiffs and defendants in a patent lawsuit.  
C. Individual Actions To Prevent Patent Troll Extortion 
Though there is advice on how to individually stop patent trolls on sites 
from Huffington Post167 to Forbes,168 the most realistic and effective tactic 
to stopping patent trolls is to understand how they work and to make sure 
the company’s legal representation understands the level of risk of actual 
infringement before settling and paying into the troll’s scheme. With legal 
counsel that is trustworthy and aware of the chances of being targeted by a 
patent troll, the costs for avoiding litigation may go up, but the costs being 
paid out in unnecessary licenses will no longer directly fund the troll’s own 
lawsuits. With the different demand letter laws in many states, it is 
important to be up to date on each state’s specific requirements. Even 
letters for infringement by one party may have to be written differently if 
sent to offices in separate states. For larger businesses, the change is 
generally not in how counsel understands the situation, but in a decision to 
be tough on patent trolls for the sake of its other targets. With no effective 
legislation, individual action is likely the most effective pathway to 
stopping trolls in the immediate future. But it may be as unclear as all the 
other options.  
Conclusion 
Patent trolls are a major problem in the United States, and they are 
specifically growing within the energy industry. The fall of oil prices has 
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initiated an increase in patent litigation between legitimate companies and a 
rise in attacks from patent trolls that is not likely to slow down without 
significant intervention. Though the technology industry has several more 
years of experience with these extortionists, most of the private techniques 
used have been fruitless in stopping the trolls and would be improbable in 
the energy industry. 
Almost half of the states have provided some form of legislation in the 
guise of business-friendly laws aimed at patent trolls and the evolved 
shotgun approach taken with their demand letters. The state laws have 
many problems, some of which are directly against the interests of most 
businesses in the state, causing major difficulties in communications 
between possible parties to a lawsuit. Though all the legislation is relatively 
new, no regulations at the state level of a completely federal system look to 
be promising, but they may have helped bring the problem to a national 
audience who holds the power to demand federal legislation. Considering 
the unique role of the Eastern District of Texas in the United States patent 
system, the Texas law may be the only state law that has a chance of 
making a dent in the large amounts of money wasted yearly on baseless 
patent lawsuits and licenses.  
There have been many attempts at federal legislation, but all have failed 
to make it to law. Without a federal level of experimentation, an effective 
law will never be found. Though the Supreme Court made changes in venue 
selection law in TC Heartland and the VENUE Act may provide the same 
relief, neither will effectively fix the newer shotgun approach of patent 
trolls, especially for business in Texas. Federal legislation to limit pre-
lawsuit communications such as in demand letters like most of the 
aforementioned state laws may be done in a less harmful approach at the 
federal level, but a study of the different effects from each state’s laws 
would be needed. Even then, there would likely be an experimentation 
period of several years before effective regulations could be put in place. 
Though there is a large outcry for change from the government; the 
technology, energy and retail industries; educators; and all sizes of 
business; no federal legislation looks likely to pass soon that has not already 
been covered in the Supreme Court. And the ability of patent trolls to adapt 
to new legal environments may always remain faster than the federal 
government.  
There are many avenues for change: pleading standards, more venue 
restrictions, patent suit communications, state laws, federal laws, high-court 
cases, and even forming giant private alliances that promise to continue 
innovation while undermining the entire patent system. But none of them 
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are likely to be as effective as a company with the proper representation 
that understands patent trolls’ tactics and is willing to do the work 
necessary to kill the trolls. The hero that takes on the modern patent troll is 
a well-informed attorney that knows how to use all the small weapons of 
state laws and venue reform to protect his clients. 
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